



Political participation in post-conflict settings:

Gendered effects of victimisation and (informal) institutional barriers

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Political participation in post-conflict settings: Gendered effects of victimisation and (informal) institutional barriers

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Abstract

A consensus seems to have emerged from the literature on the positive effects of war victimisation on political participation. This literature is however nearly silent on gendered differences. We study the effect of the 1998-99 Kosovo war on current political participation, disaggregating our analysis by the type of conflict experience, namely death or injury to self or a family member, or displacement, and by gender. We show that experience of conflict is associated with more political participation, but with important distinctions between genders by the form of participation and the type of conflict experience. Displacement is associated with more voting among women, but not among men, and with more demonstrating by men but weaker or no effects for women; death and injury are associated with higher political party membership for men, but not women. We argue that the differences identified may reflect informal barriers to women participation in post conflict settings, as the post-war political arena can be masculinised and/or building on networks established during the conflict that implicitly exclude women.

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ABBREVIATIONS

AAK – Alliance for the Future of Kosovo

EBRD – European Bank for Reconstruction and Development

FRY – Federal Republic of Yugoslavia

KDP - Kosovo Democratic Party

KLA – Kosovo Liberation Army

LITS3 – Life in Transition Survey 3rd wave (collected in 2016)

NATO – North Atlantic Treaty Organisation

NDI – National Democratic Institute

OSCE – Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe

PSU - Primary Sampling Units

UNHCR – United Nations High Commission for Refugees

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1. INTRODUCTION

The literature on the impacts of traumatic experiences suggest that victimisation can lead to either political apathy or to an increased willingness to engage with political processes¹. Empirical analyses focusing on conflict have overwhelmingly supported the latter: political participation is bolstered by war (Bauer et al., 2016). This effect is generally explained by post-traumatic growth (Blattman, 2009) or an instrumentalization of victimisation in political claims (Freitag et al., 2019).

However, these findings seem disconnected from the broader literature on political participation which has emphasised important gender differences. Women have often been shown to participate less in politics than men (Coffé and Bolzendahl, 2010, Paxton et al., 2021) from voting and membership of different groups, to representation in political parties and in elected positions.

While most of the empirical literature is silent on the gendered effects of conflict on political participation (see for example the meta-analysis by Bauer et al., 2016), Hadzic and Tavits (2019) suggests that men's participation could increase post-conflict while that of women could in fact be reduced. They argue that the violence of the war itself can lead "people to perceive post-war politics as a more combative and aggressive realm" (page 676), which would then make women more inclined to reject political participation precisely due to its violent nature. In contrast, Petesch (2018) suggests that conflict has the potential to shake gender norms and open new opportunities for women. This might arise if women fill spaces previously occupied by men in, for example, local, grass-roots projects and self-help groups during and after conflict (Bakken and Buhaug, 2021). Conversely, these new opportunities may not arise if the political arena post-conflict is characterised by informal barriers affecting women specifically or disproportionately.

With this in mind, we propose a gendered analysis of political participation in post-war Kosovo. We find that while men and women report equal incidences of conflict victimisation, these experiences have led men to be more active in political parties and to be more likely to take part in demonstrations. For women, victimisation is only associated with increased likelihood of voting. In addition, while victimisation, as being injured or having family members killed during the conflict, is driving the association with increased political party membership for men, it is victimisation as being displaced during the conflict that drives all of the other associations (i.e. increased demonstration for men, and increased voting for women).

We note that our results are robust to specification choices, including different location fixed effects, and also following Oster (2019), to selection on unobservables.

In the rest of the paper, we present a review of the literature on post-conflict political participation, with a specific focus on what is gained from adopting a gendered lens in this context in the next section. We then discuss our case-study in section 3: the aftermath of the 1999 Kosovo war, before discussing our data and method. Section 5 presents our econometric results, which are discussed further in our conclusion section. In our conclusions, we argue for the need for comparative work exploring the role of informal institutions and contextual factors on women political participation post conflict.

¹ See Bateson (2012) for analysis based on an exhaustive set of data sources and focusing on crime victimisation.

2. LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 CONFLICT AND POLITICAL PARTICIPATION

One of the paradoxes of conflict is that it can be both a destructive and a creative force for development. Conflict is often portrayed as “development in reverse”, destroying lives, livelihoods and infrastructure (Collier et al, 2003; Gates et al,2012). Yet conflict can also challenge economic, political and social norms and create opportunities for change². Some of these opportunities arise through negotiated peace-settlements which reform or create new democratic institutions, power sharing and territorial representation. Although there is contested evidence from cross-country studies about the extent to which these contribute to peace (Caplan and Hoeffler, 2017) or development (Stewart and Daga, 2017), their success relies on the ability and willingness of ordinary citizens to engage and participate in them.

Several authors have suggested that conflict leads to higher levels of political participation, more collective action, more prosocial behaviour and higher degrees of altruism (see in particular the literature review and meta-analysis proposed by Bauer et al., 2016). These effects are nearly always explained by post-traumatic growth (Blattman, 2009) or an instrumentalization of victimisation in political claims (Freitag et al., 2019). This implies that the experience of conflict leads citizens to want to take a more active and cooperative role in public affairs, and simultaneously provides a way to legitimise taking a more active role.

In empirical papers using large household surveys and information on past victimisation to assess the links between victimisation and political participation, the evidence of an increased political participation post-conflict is strong. However, this literature is surprisingly silent on gender differences. We present a review in Table A1 in the Appendix, where we have listed the key findings and information about whether a gendered analysis was conducted, and if so how. This review highlights a clear gap³. Gender is often addressed through including a gender dummy, and only a handful of papers comment on its sign and significance. Among these, only two studies discuss explicitly whether the effect of victimisation differ by gender: Adhvaryu and Fenske, 2013, who however do not provide a rationale and Garcia-Ponce, 2017, where, in line with pathways outlined by Bakken and Buhaug (2021), it is suggested that women were pushed into activities in local and grass-roots organisations during conflict and this then led to an increase in their political participation.

2.2 POLITICAL PARTICIPATION, GENDER AND CONFLICT

Against this backdrop, we draw on the work of Hadzic and Tavits (2019) and Hadzic and Tavits (2021) on post-conflict political participation and representation in Bosnia to argue that the effects of violent conflict on political participation may be gendered. Hadzic and Tavits (2019) make an important contribution by providing a rare exploration of the gendered impact of conflict in political participation. In their theorisation, they argue that as conflict and violence may increase the perception among citizens that the political arena is violent, it is likely that female political participation will be depressed, rather than raised, post-conflict. They provide evidence of this being the case in Bosnia and Herzegovina, using an experimental approach that showed that when violence had been made salient, women became less likely to report a willingness to engage in politics, while the opposite was true for men. This can be

² War has been credited for building strong states in modern Europe (Tilly and Ardant, 1975; Tilly, 1985).

³ We also indicate whether victimisation was self-reported or measured from an external source and note that victimisation seems more often associated with positive change in political participation when it is measured as individual-level self-reported victimisation, credibly implying that it is personal experience that matters rather than exposure to contextual conflict.

interpreted as an important nuancing of the “post traumatic growth” or legitimisation narrative, we mentioned in the previous section, suggesting it may apply only to men, at least in some contexts.

Importantly, female political participation has lagged behind that of men in most countries (Inglehart and Norris, 2003; Paxton et al., 2021), and explanations have often centred on differences in endowments or resources⁴. But gender norms might also play a role. Indeed, in their seminal work Verba et al. (1997) noted that differences in political participation between men and women could not be explained solely through differences in resources (such as education), but also reflected differences in interest in politics, information and efficacy – factors largely shaped by “the cues received by males and females that politics is a man’s world” (page 1051). Cross-country differences in the gender gap in political participation are linked to modernisation, with post-industrial societies displaying more gender-equal attitudes and smaller participation gaps (Inglehart and Norris, 2003). However, the factors shaping gender norms are complex and fluid, opening space for a nuancing of the role of broad driving trends such as modernisation.

Exploring further this gender gap, a more recent scholarship has evidenced a tendency for women to engage in voting (more frequently than men in some contexts) or in other forms of “private” political activism, such as signing a petition, donating or raising funds, or boycotting specific goods, while men appeared more likely to engage in public collective action (for example demonstrating) or direct contact activities (such as discussing politics in public forums, contacting politicians or the media) (Coffé and Bolzendahl, 2010). This relative gender specialisation can be posited to reflect differences in preferences or may align with social expectations as men and women gain social recognition from engaging in specific political activities differentially (Cruz and Tolentino, 2019).

In Hadzic and Tavits (2019 and 2021), the authors motivate their analyses by drawing together insights from (a) psychology, indicating that personality traits of decisiveness, dominance and aggression are associated with men and their roles as leaders and bread-winners, while women are associated with traits of care, sympathy, kindness and affection in reproductive roles in households and communities (Bauer, 2015; Eagly and Karau, 2002) and, (b) from political science and political economy revealing that post-war political actors are often rooted in, or associated with, the different sides of the violent conflict (Cederman et al., 2013; Matanock, 2017). Thus, if the post-war political environment replicates behaviours of combat and aggression, and both attracts and rewards traits associated with men, then greater engagement in politics among men is to be expected, and in turn lesser engagement among women who have less affinity with these traits (Hadzic and Tavits, 2019). Simultaneously, these views on gender roles will also affect beliefs among voters that men, or perhaps political agents displaying male personality traits, are more able to manage crises and threats to peace, security and safety (see for example Dolan, 2014; Bauer 2015; Holman et al., 2011 and 2016, Barnes and O’Brien; 2017), leading to less success for women candidates, as shown by Hadzic and Tavits (2021) in Bosnia and eventually lower representation and participation as suggested by Kindervater and Meintjes (2018).

2.3 CONFLICT VICTIMISATION AS INJURED AND KILLED VERSUS DISPLACED

A second point of interest in the theorisation of the impact of conflict exposure on political participation offered by Tavits and Hadzic (2019) relates to its violent nature. Because the experience of conflict is often complex, exposure to violence as belonging to a household in which a member has been injured or killed might have a different impact from experiencing conflict through displacement, which may be a relatively less explicitly violent experience.

⁴ See for example the paper by Schlozman et al. (1994) highlighting the role of income in explaining part of the gender differences in engagement in the US.

While some authors have considered conflict victimisation as relating to either exposure to violence or displacement jointly (see Table A1 in Appendix), distinguishing the two might be important if the relevant factor in post-conflict political participation is the perception of politics as violent or aggressive.

In addition, other factors can also lead the experience and effect of displacement to differ from other forms of victimisation. Displaced people may return home with new values reflecting experiences they have had while away – as they may be exposed to more liberal sections of the domestic population (for example in larger cities, or in areas with greater population heterogeneity) or abroad. In the context of displacement abroad in particular, exposure to different institutions may explain changes in political participation, rather, or in addition to, the trauma of experiencing war. For example, outside the war context and relying on an extensive review of the literature, Ivlevs (2021) argues that migrants who stay in more democratic host countries, acquire, and sometimes transmit to their peers back home, values that are more democratic. We explore in our analysis therefore the impacts of conflict, distinguishing between the type of war experience as well as the gender of the respondent.

3. CONFLICT IN KOSOVO

From the 1970s, Kosovo was a relatively autonomous region within Yugoslavia, but increasingly discriminatory and discretionary policies against the Albanian majority of Kosovo fuelled by the rise of Serbian nationalism (Carter, 1993, Ogden, 2000; RIINVEST, 2007) escalated in the so-called ‘Kosovo War’ of 1998–1999.

Intense confrontations between the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) forces consisting of Serbia and Montenegro led to an 11-week North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) air campaign in spring 1999 against Serbian forces, which in turn led a counter-insurgency against civilians before capitulating and withdrawing armed forces from Kosovo in June 1999, bringing the official end of the war and the creation of the United Nations administered province of Kosovo that same month (Oxford University, 2000). In the lead up to the war, civil protests had become increasingly violent and as recently as 2015/2016 (the period of the survey data we use in this paper) ongoing ethnic tensions could still erupt into violence.

Despite the brevity of the Kosovo war compared to the earlier Bosnian and Croatian Yugoslavian wars, its impact was severe, marked by attacks on civilians and massive movements of people (see Alva et al., 2002) and resulted in dramatic losses in physical, human and social capital as well as insecurity over ownership of land and other assets (Smit, 2006). Approximately 70% of the populated area was affected by the NATO air strike (European Commission, 1999). Between 10,000 and 12,000 Albanians and over 3,000 Serbs lost their lives, mostly during confrontations between the Yugoslav military, Serbian police and Serbian paramilitary forces on one side and the KLA on the other (Sklias and Roukanas, 2007). The United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) estimates that half a million ethnic Albanians were displaced within Kosovo during the conflict and an additional 800,000 moved to neighbouring countries (mostly Albania and North Macedonia), as well as in smaller numbers to Germany, the UK or the US, from a pre-conflict population of 2 million (World Bank, 2001; p. 15).

The immediate impact on citizens’ lives and livelihoods was immense. Ogden (2000) and Westley and Mikhalev (2002) document the severe constraints facing households while Douarin et al. (2012) show impacts on livelihood choices and household welfare. Evidence of victimisation can be found in numerous reports. The United States Department of State (1999) summarises evidence collected from extensive field interviews, noting the extent of violence and trauma experienced by the population overall.

Today Kosovo is recognized as an independent country by 115 countries. It has a democratic parliamentary system, consisting of 120 members, with 20 seats reserved for minorities (ten for the Serbian minority and ten for other minorities). Elections are held every four years. Voter turnout in parliamentary elections has hovered around 42-48% since the early 2000s (Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, 2021). Gender representation in parliament is secured through legislation that requires electoral lists and the overall parliament to have 30% female candidates, although in the recent 2021 elections, women won almost 40% of the seats. These quotas have been in place since 2000 and have led to a more inclusive representation of minorities and often under-represented groups in decision-making. However, women's participation in grassroots activism and political actions remains much lower than that of men as we illustrate below, and low by regional or international standards (EBRD, 2016).

An important feature of Kosovo's political landscape today, is that most parties have explicit or implicit links with the KLA. Two of the main parties today (i.e. Kosovo Democratic Party - KDP and Alliance for the Future of Kosovo - AAK) are known to be derivatives of the KLA (International Crisis Group, 2000), and a significant number of members of other parties were active in KLA during the war. In addition to this, the main political parties have been described as personality-driven patronage networks that secure loyalty in different ways (Briscoe, et al., 2011). This implies that the political debate today continues to be strongly embedded in war legacies.

Although there is no official number, women's membership in the KLA at the time of the conflict was reportedly low, most likely less than 5% (DiGeorgio-Lutz, et al., 2016 and Bartetzko, 2021). This is thought to be a disadvantage for women today, both in terms of joining parties and gaining official positions, as well as in terms of integrating valuable social networks. The political landscape and political debate are thus quite masculinised and this can be argued to have been at least partly inherited from the war.

While it is true that institutional change promoted by international organisations⁵ has led to the establishment of gender quotas and other policies to support female representation, women's representation in political parties and in leadership and decision-making positions continued to be low, both at the municipality and central level until recently (Limani, 2019). Some have argued that, regardless of the quotas, women continue not to be seen as potential leaders and are not provided with the same support as men when seeking representation. Anecdotal evidence even suggests that men have used quotas as an argument in their campaigns to sway voters in their favour, stating that women do not need the votes as they already have guaranteed seats (The National Democratic Institute - NDI, 2015). Furthermore, political parties and civil society reportedly fail to use women's turnout in elections to build strategies to educate the electorate about the importance of women's participation and to encourage women's candidature. Incumbents in political parties are mainly men, and they receive the main part of party financial support for their campaigns, therefore making it harder for women to develop proper electoral campaigns (especially those running for the first time) (The National Democratic Institute (NDI, 2015). Legislation on political party finance states that 10% of campaign funds should be allocated equally for each deputy, there is however no mechanism for monitoring this, and female representatives have reported that they almost did not benefit from this fund (Gashi, 2014). Overall, this leads us to hypothesise that in Kosovo we should expect to see gendered differences in the effect of conflict experience on political participation, as arguably, external influence on quotas and other regulations, do not seem to have reduced negative biases against women in leadership positions, and is thus likely to have been insufficient in rolling back the deep masculinisation of political parties in Kosovo. Additionally, we might expect experience of conflict to have different impacts on different types of political participation.

Following Hadzic and Tavits (2019), we would argue that for those who have experienced injuries and death in their household, active political participation (such as political party membership and

⁵ This is particularly the case now that the European Union has officially recognised Kosovo as a potential candidate country for accession, but has been the case since the early stages of the peace process, which has been strongly monitored by international organisations.

demonstrations or strikes) might be bolstered among men, who in agreement with accepted gendered roles, will be keener to engage in aggressive confrontation, and might find it easier to legitimise their participation based on their conflict experience. This is less likely to be true for women who may associate the combative nature of party politics with the violence of the war.

The effects of displacement might also vary by gender. If displacement does affect political participation through exposure to more progressive gendered norms and behaviours, then we may see an impact among women on the less active forms of political participation, where direct confrontation is unlikely, (such as voting or signing a petition), in the spirit of the post-traumatic growth hypothesis⁶.

Before proceeding to the empirical part of this paper, it is important to note that social norms in Bosnia and Herzegovina or Kosovo regarding gender roles and gender equality are fairly traditionalist. The conceptual framework developed so far implies that contextual factors relating to the characteristics of the political context can interact with gender norms to create specific barriers to some forms of women political participation – in contexts where either the post-conflict political arena is not perceived as more violent, or where gender norms are more equal, the legacies of post-conflict victimisation may exhibit different patterns across genders. This suggests that more analyses allowing to explore these gendered patterns in a broader comparative frame would be welcomed to further consolidate our understanding of these conflict legacies.

4. METHODOLOGY

4.1 EMPIRICAL STRATEGY

We examine the impact of war victimisation during the Kosovo war in 1998-99 on individual levels of political participation in 2016. We use an empirical approach typical of the quantitative literature (see Bauer et al., 2016) as summarised in Equation 1.

Specifically, we regress indicators of different forms of political participation (PP_{ij}) against a set of respondents' characteristics (X_{ij}), their self-reported war experience (C_{ij}), and a set of ethnicity and location-specific fixed effects, reflecting either primary sampling units or municipalities (L_j), as explained below. Departing from the extant literature, we split our sample between female and male respondents to discuss differential impacts along gender lines (see Equations 2 and 3 respectively)⁷.

$$PP_{ij} = \alpha_0 + \beta_1 C_{ij} + \beta_2 X_{ij} + \beta_3 L_j + \varepsilon_{ij} \quad (1)$$

$$PP_{ij} = \alpha_0 + \beta_1 C_{ij} + \beta_2 X_{ij} + \beta_3 L_j + \varepsilon_{ij} \text{ if } gender = F \quad (2)$$

$$PP_{ij} = \alpha_0 + \beta_1 C_{ij} + \beta_2 X_{ij} + \beta_3 L_j + \varepsilon_{ij} \text{ if } gender = M \quad (3)$$

The survey data we use include a rich set of political behaviours, allowing us to investigate gender differences regarding voting, participating in different forms of protest or joining a political party. We

⁶ According to the "Electoral Democracy Index" of V-Dem, immediately prior to (and during) the conflict Serbia (and then Kosovo) ranked lower than neighbouring countries of Albania and North Macedonia, which hosted large proportions of those displaced from Kosovo (V-Dem 2022).

⁷ We note that we have also ran fully interacted models as robustness checks. The results obtained were consistent with those presented here. Split sample regressions were chosen over interacted models for ease of presentation.

are also able to measure conflict experience along several dimensions including being displaced during the conflict or having a family member killed or injured during the war.

To address issues relating to endogeneity, we adopt three strategies, exploring selection on observables, measurement error in the war experience variables, and possible omitted variable bias using the method suggested by Oster (2019), described below.

4.2 DATA AND KEY VARIABLES

We use the third round of the Life in Transition Survey (LiTS3), a large household survey fielded between 2015 and 2016 by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) and the World Bank in 34 countries. The Kosovan sample includes 1500 households randomly selected within 75 Primary Sampling Units (PSUs), by means of stratified sampling clustered by region and level of urbanity. These PSUs are small and “are electoral districts, polling station territories, census enumeration districts or geo-administrative divisions” (Child and Nikolova, 2020, page 4). Small rural municipalities will typically include one PSU, while larger urban municipalities might include more than one.

In each household, a primary respondent was selected randomly among the eligible adults (18 years old or more). This selection criterium is conveniently also appropriate for a study focusing on political participation as all respondents are legally eligible to vote in Kosovo.

4.2.1 Political Participation Variables

The survey includes six questions capturing political participation: two of which might be considered “private” in the typology suggested by Coffé and Bolzendahl (2010), namely voting in local and in parliamentary elections, and a set of more visible, possibly more emotionally charged, collective “public” forms of participation, namely membership of a political party, taking part in a strike, signing a petition, and joining a lawful demonstration.

Whether the respondent is a member of a political party, has voted in the more recent local elections or has voted in the most recent national (i.e. parliamentary) elections are coded simply as yes/no binary dummies.

For the other three questions, respondents were asked if they would take part (hypothetically), have taken part or would never take part. Because the responses to these questions capture both actual and hypothetical actions, we construct two dummies for each. The first dummy groups actual participation and a stated willingness to participate, with the reference being would never take part, thus capturing willingness to participate (hypothetical or real) versus unwillingness (called *strike1*, *petition1* and *demonstration1* in Table 1). The second set captures actual participation versus non-participation, regardless of whether the respondent says they hypothetically might take part (called *strike2*, *petition2* and *demonstration2* in Table 1). We use this more explicit definition of actual participation (i.e. *strike2*, *petition2* and *demonstration2*) in our main analysis, and test the robustness of our results using the broader “willingness” definition.

Table 1: Political participation by gender

VARIABLES	(1) Women	(2) Men	(3) Difference
Voting (local)	0.719 (0.450)	0.812 (0.391)	0.093*** (0.000)
Voting (parliament)	0.658 (0.475)	0.751 (0.432)	0.093*** (0.001)
Political party member	0.064 (0.246)	0.137 (0.344)	0.072*** (0.000)
Strike1 (yes and willing)	0.431 (0.496)	0.649 (0.478)	0.218*** (0.000)
Strike2 (yes only)	0.058 (0.233)	0.151 (0.358)	0.094*** (0.000)
Demonstration1 (yes and willing)	0.515 (0.500)	0.728 (0.445)	0.213*** (0.000)
Demonstration2 (yes only)	0.105 (0.306)	0.224 (0.418)	0.120*** (0.000)
Petition1 (yes and willing)	0.614 (0.487)	0.805 (0.396)	0.191*** (0.000)
Petition2 (yes only)	0.176 (0.381)	0.313 (0.464)	0.136*** (0.000)
Observations	765	735	1,500

Notes: strike1, demonstration1 and petition1 are defined such that actual participation in the past or a willingness to participate in the future are coded as 1, 0 otherwise; whereas strike2, demonstration2 and strike2 are defined such that only actual past participation are coded as 1, 0 otherwise.

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

We summarise these variables by gender in Table 1. We note that for all forms of political participation, women participate significantly less than men, with relatively smaller gaps found in voting. The differences between men and women are smaller for the more explicit definition of participation in strikes, petitions, and demonstrations, providing a more rigorous test of gender differences.

4.2.2 War Experience Variables

The LiTS3 survey asks respondents about their experience of the war with three questions: (i) whether or not the respondent or a family member was injured during the conflict, (ii) if a family member was killed or (iii) whether the family was displaced during the conflict⁸. These questions are in line with those used elsewhere in the literature to construct measures of conflict victimisation (e.g. Blattman, 2009 or Cassar et al., 2013).

⁸ Unfortunately, the survey data does not record where the respondent was displaced to, or for how long, which means we cannot explore the extent to which any effects of displacement on political participation might be due to exposure to stronger democratic regimes and more progressive gendered norms.

As we have argued in section 2, it is possible that the experience and effect of displacement differs from other forms of victimisation. Rather than create a single variable capturing any war experience, we thus explore the separate effect of these two forms of victimisation (see Table 2)⁹.

Table 2: War experiences

Victimisation	Displaced		
	Yes	No	Total
Killed or injured			
Yes	237	112	349
No	202	949	1,151
Total	439	1,061	1,500

4.2.3 Controls

We present two models, one with arguably only exogenous variables that should not have been affected by the conflict, namely age, gender and ethnicity, parental education¹⁰, and a second which includes the respondent’s own education, noting that this might have been affected by the war for some of the respondents. These models are presented by way of a robustness check.

4.3 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS

Further descriptive statistics are presented in Table 3. [A correlation table can also be found in the appendix, Table A2]. Nearly as many women as men were interviewed in the LiTS3 survey in Kosovo. Respondents are on average 43 years old. About 50% of the respondents have reached secondary education, just under 20% have some tertiary education. Women are less educated than men, and similarly the reported education of the mothers of respondents is lower than that of their fathers. Women’s employment rates are lower than men’s, illustrating the fairly conservative and traditional values prevalent in Kosovo.

⁹ The survey includes separate questions relating to having a household member injured versus killed during the conflict, this would thus allow us theoretically to investigate these two forms of victimisations separately. 21% of the respondents reports having experienced injuries and 11% have experienced the killing of a family member, but 78% of those reporting a killing have also experienced injuries. We thus investigate these 2 forms of victimisation jointly. In regressions conducted with separate indicators for killed and injured, our findings appeared to be carried by the experience of injuries.

¹⁰ These are the odd numbered regressions in our tables.

Table 3- Descriptive Statistics

VARIABLES	Sample Mean	Sample St. dev.	Women mean	Men mean	difference
Conflict affected (any)	0.367	0.482	0.370	0.365	-0.005
Killed or Injured	0.233	0.423	0.242	0.223	-0.019
Displaced	0.292	0.455	0.294	0.291	-0.003
Gender (male = 1)	0.490	0.500			
Age	43.161	16.235	42.784	43.554	0.769
Employment	0.527	0.499	0.302	0.761	0.459***
Own education (Secondary)	0.512	0.500	0.435	0.592	0.157***
Own education (Tertiary)	0.185	0.388	0.135	0.237	0.102***
Hh income (ln)	4.642	0.737	4.629	4.655	0.026
Father education (Secondary)	0.308	0.462	0.315	0.302	-0.013
Father education (Tertiary)	0.084	0.277	0.076	0.093	0.017
Mother education (Secondary)	0.177	0.382	0.184	0.170	-0.013
Mother education (Tertiary)	0.27	0.162	0.022	0.033	0.011

Importantly, the level of victimisation does not differ significantly across gender: men and women are as likely to report having a household member that was killed or injured during the conflict, and as likely to have been displaced. However, as already noted their experience of the conflict is likely to have been very different, with victimisation likely to trigger differing responses.

4.4 LOCATION-SPECIFIC FIXED EFFECTS AND DEALING WITH MOVERS

Our specifications differ in terms of sample and fixed effects. Specifications 1 and 2 are based on the full sample of respondents (excluding only those with missing data) and include fixed effects for the municipality of residence at the time at which they took the survey. Some of the largest municipalities include several PSU, so specifications 3 and 4 disaggregate these fixed effects and include PSU dummies instead. These regressions control for the local context in which current political participation is taking place and are shown in columns 1-4 of each table.

Because the conflict finished 18 years before the survey data was collected, a number of respondents had relocated and did not live, at the time of the survey, where they had lived when the conflict started (independently of whether or not they were also displaced during the conflict). In the survey, 1227 people out of 1500 report living today where they were living at the onset of the conflict. Among the remaining 273 respondents, the questionnaire allowed us to establish that 209 (150 of which are women) had relocated to their current place of residence after the conflict had finished and had reported having moved from their place of birth. Hence, we were able to establish the place of residence at the onset of the conflict for 1436 respondents, as being their place of birth or their current place of residence.

In specifications 5 and 6, we thus restrict our sample to the non-movers, i.e. who lived at the time they took the survey in the same location as during the conflict: this sample is smaller and in particular excludes a disproportionately large number of women. But in these specifications, the PSU-level fixed effects absorb both information pertaining to the local conflict intensity and the context in which respondents are currently politically active.

Finally, specifications 7 and 8 include the additional 209 respondents (three-quarters of whom are women) who moved after the conflict but for whom we can identify their place of residence at the onset

of the conflict, but only at the municipality level, capturing respondent's exposure to conflict intensity at the municipality level (which we refer to as "location" in the tables). Finally, in all cases standard errors are clustered at the PSU-level (at current location)¹¹.

4.5 ENDOGENEITY

To be able to argue that we are estimating a causal effect of victimisation we would need war experiences to be randomly distributed across the population. We address this issue by examining selection on observables, measurement error in the war experience variables and selection on unobservables. This discussion allows to shed light on potential threats to identification and helps build reasonable confidence in the results presented, but we remain cautious and discuss our results as associations.

4.5.1 Selection on observables

In Kosovo, conflict violence was reported to be indiscriminate, as the Serbs engaged in violence against civilians purely based on their ethnicity. According to the OSCE (1999), "No-one, it seems, was immune, as people of all ages, including women and children, were killed in large numbers". Similarly, during the NATO air-strike, the extent of the bombing and the small size of the country led to extensive and broadly distributed damage, with civilian casualties arising "by mistakes" rather than through any form of targeting. Overall, this supports the idea that within ethnic groups and within locations of residence during the war, victimisation should be orthogonal to pre-conflict political participation. However, there is some evidence in other contexts that displacement is not random (Engel and Ibañez, 2007 and Ibañez et al, 2019): it is possible that displacement reflects a weighing up of the expected economic, social and psychic costs of moving versus staying.

We assess the likelihood of selection into victimisation by estimating models using the controls and fixed effects described above. The results are shown in Table A3 and suggest that selection on observables is not an issue: none of our controls are significant beyond age, once we control for ethnicity and location fixed effects. We note that it is reasonable for older respondents to be more frequently found among the war victims. Indeed, whether we look at the determinants of (i) being displaced, (ii) reporting a household member as injured or killed during the conflict, or (iii) both (i.e. conflict affected- any) there is no sign of selection on observables. We can also emphasise that the regressions in table A3 show that gender is not significant in explaining victimisation, either through injuries and death or through displacement or both jointly – that is to say men and women are equally likely to have been victims in all cases.

4.5.2 Measurement error


Another concern regarding causality is that victimisation is "self-reported" and potentially subject to reporting biases. We however analyse victimisation within narrowly defined PSU or (slightly larger) municipalities. As data on objective measures of conflict intensity can only be aggregated at the municipality level, the effects that we will report are finer-grained, and imply that any effect identified for victimisation is measured given the objective level of exposure to conflict intensity experienced within a small locality, in other words: we are measuring the effect of being personally directly affected by the conflict rather than exposed to a certain contextual intensity of violence. Implicitly, we are

¹¹ Estimations with region-level fixed effects are available upon request.

assuming that any noise in measurement is orthogonal to political participation today, in keeping with the majority of the literature (e.g. Bellows and Miguel 2009 or Cassar et al., 2013).

Nevertheless, we illustrate the reliability of the self-reported measure of victimisation. Figure 1 plots the correlation between self-reported victimisation aggregated at the municipality of residence during conflict and a measure of conflict intensity derived from the Housing Damage Assessment Survey (European Commission, 1999), an exercise conducted between February and July 1999 to evaluate the extent of damage inflicted on towns and villages during the war¹². We use weights reflecting the number of respondents by location to account for the likely lower precision of the aggregate in areas where few respondents were interviewed. We find that municipality-level victimisation is significantly and positively correlated with damage.

Figure 1 Correlation between self-reported victimisation aggregated at the municipality of residence during the conflict and weighted by the number of respondents (LITS3, 2016) and the extent of damage (EC, 1999)



¹² Douarin et al. (2012) use this data to build an index capturing the degree of damage at the municipality level to relate conflict intensity to livelihood choices after the war.

4.5.3 Selection on unobservables

We use Oster (2019) to assess whether unobservable variables could explain some of the effect of conflict victimisation on specific forms of political participation, and so discuss the robustness of our findings to potential omitted variable biases. For example, it is plausible that prior political activity increases the likelihood of conflict victimisation, although the literature for Kosovo suggests otherwise. Oster (2019) is a statistical method whereby a reasonable threshold of explanatory power ($R\text{-max}$) is set and then asks, given that threshold, how large the effects of unobservables would need to be in order for the confidence interval of the coefficient of interest to contain 0. Oster recommends $R\text{-max}$ to be set at $1.3 \cdot R$, where R is the R -square of the specification of interest. For completeness, we also present results for a more conservative thresholds of $2 \cdot R$. We show the results of this analysis below.

To err on the side of caution, we still interpret our results as correlations or associations rather than causal relations.

5. RESULTS

5.1 VOTING AND VICTIMISATION

We first present our results regarding voting in local and parliamentary elections. Table 4 presents the determinants of voting in local elections for the whole sample of respondents (men and women) with conflict victimisation being captured through two indicators, one for displacement and one for reporting someone was killed or injured in the household. In the odd-numbered specifications, we keep our controls to pre-war controls only and include age, age-squared, gender, education of the father and education of the mother, and ethnicity (note that the coefficients estimated for ethnicity are not reported in the tables due to space limitations). In the even numbered specifications, we add the respondent's own level of education, as it is usually an important driver of political participation, recognising that own education is a “dirty control” for at least some of the respondents.

Table 4 reveals that local voting is driven by parental education, with increasing levels of education of the father in particular being associated with a greater propensity to vote, men are significantly more likely to vote, and voting propensity has an inverted-U shape relationship with age.

Conflict victimisation seems only weakly relevant to voting, with our two conflict victimisation dummies being positively associated with voting in all specifications, but only displacement having any statistically significant effect, and that at only the 10% level, and in only two specifications (namely 1 and 2). While this small and weakly significant effect is in line with the literature (see the meta-analysis by Bauer et al., 2016), it is intriguing however that it is present here only in the specifications which include a larger number of female respondents.

Table 4: Voting in Local election – Full sample


VARIABLES	(1) Local	(2) Local	(3) Local	(4) Local	(5) Local	(6) Local	(7) Local	(8) Local
Killed or Injured	0.024 (0.031)	0.023 (0.030)	0.041 (0.035)	0.039 (0.035)	0.023 (0.040)	0.023 (0.040)	0.032 (0.033)	0.031 (0.033)
Displaced	0.054* (0.029)	0.052* (0.029)	0.014 (0.040)	0.015 (0.040)	0.029 (0.040)	0.030 (0.040)	0.046 (0.029)	0.046 (0.028)
Age	0.016*** (0.004)	0.015*** (0.004)	0.017*** (0.005)	0.016*** (0.004)	0.018*** (0.005)	0.017*** (0.005)	0.015*** (0.004)	0.014*** (0.004)
Age squared	-0.000*** (0.000)	-0.000*** (0.000)	-0.000*** (0.000)	-0.000*** (0.000)	-0.000*** (0.000)	-0.000*** (0.000)	-0.000*** (0.000)	-0.000*** (0.000)
Gender	0.078*** (0.022)	0.064*** (0.023)	0.077*** (0.024)	0.056** (0.026)	0.096*** (0.027)	0.078*** (0.028)	0.083*** (0.021)	0.069*** (0.022)
Own Education (Secondary)		0.022 (0.022)		0.050* (0.027)		0.043 (0.030)		0.023 (0.021)
Own Education (Tertiary)		0.106** (0.039)		0.133*** (0.039)		0.101** (0.043)		0.101*** (0.037)
Father Education (Secondary)	0.074*** (0.020)	0.057** (0.022)	0.076** (0.032)	0.055 (0.033)	0.062* (0.036)	0.047 (0.037)	0.076*** (0.021)	0.059** (0.023)
Father Education (Tertiary)	0.122*** (0.040)	0.093* (0.045)	0.119** (0.047)	0.086* (0.049)	0.121** (0.052)	0.095* (0.055)	0.109*** (0.037)	0.081* (0.042)
Mother Education (Secondary)	-0.056 (0.057)	-0.065 (0.058)	-0.052 (0.045)	-0.060 (0.045)	-0.064 (0.050)	-0.067 (0.050)	-0.038 (0.051)	-0.046 (0.052)
Mother Education (Tertiary)	-0.229*** (0.081)	-0.244*** (0.080)	-0.207** (0.093)	-0.223** (0.092)	-0.211** (0.104)	-0.220** (0.102)	-0.244** (0.092)	-0.256*** (0.090)
Constant	0.174** (0.072)	0.123 (0.080)	0.203* (0.112)	0.182 (0.112)	0.188 (0.113)	0.178 (0.113)	-0.257** (0.126)	-0.254* (0.133)
Observations	1,400	1,400	1,400	1,400	1,142	1,142	1,339	1,339
R-squared	0.122	0.127	0.200	0.207	0.217	0.221	0.151	0.157
municipality and ethnicity FE	Yes	Yes						
location and ethnicity FE							Yes	Yes
psu and ethnicity FE			Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes		

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Next, we re-estimate these models, but for 2 distinct sub-groups: female respondents only, and male respondents only (in line with Equation 2 and Equation 3). These results are presented in table format in Appendix for the interested readers (Tables A3 and A4), but we will focus our discussion here on Figure 2 below. This illustrates the estimates based on our preferred specification for male and female respondents, that is to say a specification with pre-conflict controls only, and location fixed effects based on municipality of residence during the conflict (i.e. reflecting specification 7 in our result tables).

Figure 2: Estimated coefficients: local voting




In Figure 2, the point estimate for each variable in our specification is represented by a dot on a segment of a line representing the 95% confidence interval. This representation thus allows to visualise both the point estimate and its precision: if the confidence interval crosses the vertical line set at 0, the estimate is not significant at the 5% level. The superposition of our estimates for the male and female samples on one unique graph allows for a direct comparison of the drivers of political participation by gender. The relative importance of each variable in explaining political participation can also be assessed visually by comparing the relative position of the point estimates. For example, we can see from Figure 2 that women who have been displaced during the conflict are nearly 20 percentage points more likely to vote in local elections, this association between women voting and displacement is of a comparable magnitude to that of having a father with tertiary education (where primary education or less is the reference).

Without presenting an overly detailed discussion of the controls in this figure, we note that the drivers of local voting are different for men and women, if not in the direction of their association, in their magnitude (see in particular the variables relating to education), emphasising the importance of recognising the distinctly gendered prisms through which decisions regarding political participation are taken (see for example Cruz and Tolentino, 2019).

In addition to this, conflict victimisation is in fact only relevant for women, with a large, and more precisely estimated effect of displacement for women, and much weaker, less precise and less robust results for male respondents¹³.

We repeat the analyses for parliamentary voting. For conciseness, the relevant table in Appendix is abridged as we report only our key coefficients of interest, i.e. those pertaining to reporting a household member as killed or injured, or being displaced during the conflict (see table A6 in Appendix). Here, we will focus our discussion on Figure 3 below, which is again based on our preferred specification (i.e. specification 7).

Figure 3: Estimated coefficients: Parliamentary voting



The results in Figure 3 regarding parliamentary voting show similar patterns to those reported for voting in local election: we find consistently positive effects of displacement on voting for female respondents, although these are only weakly significant in our preferred specification (and not consistently significant depending on the location fixed effects used, see appendix Table A6. Displacement is significant only in the specifications with larger female representation: see discussion on “dealing with movers” in section 4 of this paper).


5.2 PARTY MEMBERSHIP, STRIKES, PETITIONS AND DEMONSTRATIONS

Regarding political party membership (Figure 4), war victimisation seems to have bolstered this type of political engagement. However, in contrast to the more private and civic acts of voting, the effect is due this time to experiencing death and injuries in the household, is borne entirely from the male sample: men experiencing a war death or injury in the family are between 10 and 15 percentage points more

¹³ We note that this is true over all specifications presented Tables A4 and A5 in the Appendix.


likely to be party members than men who did not, and this is precisely estimated across all specifications. No effect is identified on the female sample. These results are stronger in our preferred specification as illustrated in Figure 4, but hold true in all specifications (see Table A7 in Appendix).

Figure 4: Estimated coefficients: Political Party Membership



For participating in demonstrations, we find that men who have been displaced are more likely to demonstrate. This effect is strongest in our preferred specification (Figure 5), but the increased likelihood being of about 15 percentage points, and significant at least at the 5 percent level in all specifications presented (see Table A8 in appendix). No significant effect is detected for women.

Figure 5: Estimated coefficients: Demonstrating



Two other forms of political participation were also analysed, namely taking part in a strike or signing a petition, the results are presented in Table A9 and Table A10 in Appendix respectively. They are presented in Figure 6 below, but we will limit our discussion of these to saying that we find either no impact of conflict victimisation, or impacts that are weak and not robust across specification.¹⁴

5.3 ROBUSTNESS TO OMITTED VARIABLE/UNOBSERVABLE BIAS

Using our preferred specification again (i.e. specification 7 in the tables in Appendix), we also implement Oster’s method to investigate the degree to which unobservables can credibly threaten to overturn our results. The results are presented in Table 5. The first line of results focuses on the estimated effect of displacement on local voting on our sample of women only, and we see that unobservables would need to have a nearly five-time greater explanatory power as our observables overall, to explain away the positive effect we find for displacement on voting, using Oster’s preferred threshold of $R_{max}=1.3*R$. Results for the higher threshold of $2*R$ are consistent and show that unobservables would need to be 1.6 times more important than observables. We see similarly large and implausible values for the effect of conflict on other outcomes for women and for men. We can thus be confident that our results are robust to omitted variable biases, with the role of displacement on local voting and demonstration by women being particularly strong.

¹⁴ Regarding strikes, demonstration and signing a petition, we reproduced the analysis but with an indicator equal to 1 if the respondents had participated or would consider participating in these actions and 0 if had never done so (see discussion in the data section). Results are available upon request.

Table 5. Omitted variable bias: thresholds on importance of unobservables relative to observables to explain away the key coefficients in Figure 3

Coefficient tested	Threshold:	Threshold
	Rmax=1.3R	Rmax=2R
Effect of displacement on Local voting (women only)	4.975	1.697
Effect of displacement on Parliamentary voting (women only)	3.027	0.989
Effect of “Injured or killed” on Political party membership (men only)	3.068	1.25
Effect of displacement on Demonstration (women only)	4.695	1.47

Note: Authors’ calculations based on Oster (2019).

6. DISCUSSION

Our study makes an important contribution to the literature on the effects of conflict on political participation by providing a gendered analysis of the effects of different forms of conflict victimisation. Our analysis reveals effects which overall are in line with the results reported elsewhere in the literature. In particular, the coefficients we have estimated for our mixed gender sample are fairly compatible with the average results in this literature, as reported in Bauer et al. (2016). But our gendered analysis allows us to nuance these findings in important ways.

Regarding voting for example, we find that war victimisation is associated with a greater propensity to vote, but this effect reflects a significantly greater level of participation among victimised women only. In contrast, the increase in demonstrating and in political party membership is exclusively driven by men. Hence, at least as recently as 2015/2016, conflict victimisation played out differently across men and women in line with the broader literature on political participation and gender. We can also note that we detect no differences in exposure to conflict experiences by gender, hence any difference in effect on aggregate is more likely to be due to differences in the impact of victimisation, rather than differences in incidence.

As we have argued in our conceptual framework, illustrating these distinctions is very important for our understanding of the link between victimisation and political participation. If conflict is to change the status quo, then it would seem that it needs to change traditional patterns of gendered specialisation in political engagement. The effect of conflict on women’s political participation appears to have been channelled into civic actions such as voting. While these are far from passive acts, they are arguably less emotionally charged or disruptive than demonstrating and joining political parties. This suggests that while victimisation can bolster political participation, in the case of Kosovo it does not appear to have been in a way that has challenged gender norms. This is compatible with the overall theorisation expressed in Hadzic and Tavits (2019, 2021) that direct experience of conflict violence, in contexts where political parties have emerged from former fighters’ groups, can lead to increasing the perception that politics is violent and might put off women from being directly and actively engaged. Previous work had suggested a “growth mindset” as a credible mechanism linking victimisation to increased political participation (Blattman, 2009). This mechanism would not imply a gendered impact of victimisation.

Instead, if victimisation is instrumentalised in political participation as suggested by Freitag et al. (2019), then gendered narrative around heroes and victims could lead to a gendered impact on political participation. Similarly, personality traits and a perception that politics is violence, could also lead the effect of victimisation to confirm social norms on gender roles. In other words, the nature of the post-conflict setting does interact with societal norms around gender norms creating specific entry passes and barriers shaping the relationship between victimisation and political participation.

In addition, our results reveal marked differences in the effect of victimisation as explicitly experiencing violence (i.e. injured and killed) versus victimisation as experiencing displacement. Indeed, the positive association between increased participation in voting and victimisation for women only holds among those displaced during the conflict. While displaced men are more likely to demonstrate, i.e. to take part in more grass-root movements.

Kosovo since the end of the conflict has been characterised by a high level of institutional change, often spurred or overseen by international organisation, be it NATO in early years or the European Union through the mechanism for accession in more recent years. This has contributed to a specific state building pathway and peace settlement in the country, characterised for example by quotas for female and minorities representation. Interestingly, our analysis shows that the relatively high representation of women in parliament today might be largely due to the gender quotas rather than a hypothesised post-conflict personal growth. Indeed, at least in 2016 (when our data was collected) there was still no sign of a surge in female membership of political parties or other associations, led by victimisation, as could have been expected from the “post-traumatic growth” hypothesis for conflict victims. Importantly, gender quotas are also a war legacy, and while they seem to have led to better female representation and arguably might have been associated with a rise in female political participation, our results suggest that victimisation did not strengthen the effect of quotas.

Building a broader comparative view of the effect of war victimisation on gendered patterns of political participation is a worthy research agenda. Future empirical research might usefully explore the extent to which displacement of women, along with children and the elderly, as seen in Ukraine, might frame women as needing protection and men as heroes and defenders, and in turn presents a barrier to participation of women in political parties post-conflict. Richer data on war-time experiences and on beliefs and values about gender norms would enable a deeper analysis of the nuances of what experiences are more likely to lead to increase political participation, and for whom. In addition, it would be interesting to explore gendered voting patterns further to understand to what extent increases in female representation in legislative bodies are due to quotas or to increased female turnout, and how this interplays with the conflict experiences of both candidates and voters.

Overall, our work strongly suggests that more work is needed to explore how gender norms and the characteristics of the post-conflict political arena interacts to shape the link between victimisation and political participation. It opens up an agenda for research exploring informal institutions as important factors to a more nuanced understanding of post-conflict political participation.

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Appendix

Table A1: Summary of the Literature on Conflict and collective action/political participation

Paper	context	Main data sources	Conflict victimisation variable	Finding on impact of conflict	Gender treatment	Finding on gender
Adhvaryu and Fenske (2013)	17 sub-African countries	Diverse	Locality-level battle deaths	Exposure to war decreases collective action for men, but increases interest in politics. However, the effects estimated are very small. No effects for Women.	Analysis based on local-level measure of intensity, not own-experience, shows no effect for women on voting or collective action or interest in politics.	Different effects for men versus women are discussed with conflict having no effects on women's political participation and small effects on men.
Alacevich and Zejcirovic (2020)	Bosnian ethnic civil war 1992-1995	Voter turnout data 1990-2014 Household survey data 2006 (LITS1)	Municipality level measure of war intensity	Decreases voter turnout, caused by violence against civilians rather than against soldiers.	Not controlled for in municipality level analysis. Not reported in household level analysis.	n/a
Bellows and Miguel (2009)	1991-2002 Sierra Leone Civil war	Household data collected in 2005 and 2007 Chiefdom level attacks and battles	Self-reported victimisation of household members (index: based on HH members killed injured or displaced) Chiefdom conflict intensity	HH victimisation increases likelihood of attending community meetings, being a member of a social or political group	Gender is controlled for in HH level analysis, and women are less politically active. In an analysis of heterogenous effects (not reported), an interaction term between gender and	While women are as likely to be victim, they are less likely to be politically active after the conflict than men. The effect of conflict on men and women is stated not to be

					victimisation is included and “not generally statistically significant”.	significantly different.
Blattman (2009)	Uganda		Ex-combatant	Increased political participation of ex-combatant (voted, community mobilizer, any community group membership)	The study focuses on male combatants only	n/a
Cassar et al. (2013)	1992-1996 Tajik Civil war	Experiments and HH survey fielded in 2010.	Self-reported victimisation in the HH (injured or killed)	Reduces trust and willingness to exchange beyond kin Increases participation in groups and community meetings.	Gender controlled for in trust regressions and group membership regressions.	Female respondents are as likely to report victimisation, but gender is not a significant driver of trust. No exploration of gendered effects of conflict. Gender is controlled for but not reported in the group participation analysis.
Child and Nikolova (2020)	WW2 in Europe and more recent civil conflicts – 15 countries.	HH survey collected in 2010 (LITS2)	Self-reported (as injured or killed in the HH) and external source exposure	While protest, party membership, voting and social capital increase with self-reported victimisation, effects are	Gender dummy	Men are more likely to protest and be a party member. No significant

			(location-specific – 15 km radius)	negative or insignificant when an external source of data is used to measure objective conflict exposure.		differences for voting or social capital. No exploration of gendered effects of conflict.
De Juan and Pierskalla (2016)	Civil war in Nepal 1996-2003	HH World Health Survey 2003 – with geo-location of each household	NGO-collected data on killings by rebel and government forces.	Political trust (national government) decreases with exposure to conflict violence	Gender dummy (significant)	No gender differences in political trust. No exploration of gendered effects of conflict.
De Luca et Verpoorten (2015a)	Protracted violence in Uganda 1996-2006	HH surveys (2000, 2005, 2008, 2012)	District-level LRA violent event days from ACLED	Increases civic participation (attend meeting) but not electoral participation (voting in presidential election) in communities affected by violence.	Gender is controlled for but not reported, and no analysis into heterogeneity by gender is reported.	n/a
De Luca et Verpoorten (2015b)	Uganda	HH surveys (2000, 2005, 2008, 2012)	District-level LRA violent event days from ACLED	Decreases association contemporaneously, but recovery in the medium term	Gender is controlled for but not reported, and no analysis into heterogeneity by gender is reported.	n/a
Freitag et al. (2019)	1998-199 Kosovo war	HH survey 2010 (LITS3)	Self-reported victimisation in the HH (injured, killed or displaced)	War victimisation increases the propensity of protest (demonstrating or striking) and to sign	Gender dummy	Women less likely to protest or sign petitions, but no discussion of a possible differential

			Use PCA to generate an indicator of victimisation	petitions, but no significant effects on voting or political party membership		effect of war across gender.
Garcia-Ponce (2017)	1980- mid 1990s Shining Path insurgency, Peru	Election data in 1995 and 1998; HH survey data for 2008	Being born and raised in a conflict-affected municipality.	Conflict has a significant impact on women's participation but no effect for men.	Gender dummy and split sample.	Women exposed to violence in childhood more likely to be politically active but no effect for men; author suggests this is driven by behavioural response of women, specifically coping strategies involving grass roots, local organisation to cope with adverse effects of violence.
Gilligan et al. (2014)	1996-2006 Nepal civil war	Experiment fielded in 2009	Conflict-affected community (objective)	Affected community exhibit higher levels of political and community level mobilization, as well as higher trust and pro-sociality	Political and community mobilisation only computed at community level.	n/a
Grosjean (2014)	WW2 in Europe and more recent civil conflicts	HH survey collected in 2010 (LITS)	Self-reported victims of WW2 in the family: parents, grandparents	Conflict spurs collective action: more group membership and	No control reported for gender.	n/a

			or self (injured or killed). Self reported victims of civil wars in the HH (injured or killed)	political party membership But less general trust and less trust in institutions		
Rohner et al. (2013)	Ethnic conflict in Uganda 2002-2005	HH survey (Afrobarometer) 2000 and 2008, HH are georeferenced	County-level measure of exposure based on ACLED data of fighting events.	Intense fighting decreases general trust	Gender (dummy) controlled for but not reported	n/a
Voors and Bulte (2014)	Several periods of civil war in Burundi	HH and community surveys collected in 2007	HH level victimisation as death of a HH member, theft, ambush, forced labor, intimidation, destruction of assets. A community-level measure was then created by aggregating HH responses at the community level	Cooperation increases with victimisation measured at the village level, but not at the household level. No effect on generalised trust.	Gender dummy	No discussion of a possible differential effect of victimisation across gender.

This table updates and builds on Bauer et al. (2016), reporting findings from analysis on the impact of conflict on individuals or households, but here we add details on gendered analysis and findings and focus on outcomes which are strictly about political participation (so voting, association, political party membership, community engagement, etc.) and we thus exclude articles about cooperation or trust games.

Table A2: Correlation table

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17
1. Local voting	1.00																
2. Parliamentary voting	0.79	1.00															
3. Political party	0.12	0.11	1.00														
4. Demonstration	0.03	0.05	0.16	1.00													
5. Strike	-0.03	-0.02	0.07	0.60	1.00												
6. Petition	0.03	0.05	0.14	0.64	0.51	1.00											
7. Killed or injured	0.05	0.07	0.12	0.07	0.03	0.07	1.00										
8. Displaced	0.07	0.10	0.06	0.08	0.02	0.05	0.47	1.00									
9. Gender (ref: men)	-0.11	-0.10	-0.13	-0.18	-0.16	-0.17	0.04	0.00	1.00								
10. Age	0.11	0.12	0.03	0.02	0.10	-0.04	0.09	0.06	-0.01	1.00							
11. Own education (sec.)	-0.02	-0.04	0.02	0.12	0.05	0.05	-0.03	-0.06	-0.15	-0.21	1.00						
12. Own education (tertiary)	0.07	0.06	0.09	0.09	0.12	0.13	0.02	0.01	-0.13	-0.16	-0.48	1.00					
13. Father education (sec.)	-0.02	-0.05	0.05	0.09	0.08	0.11	-0.04	-0.08	0.02	-0.34	0.18	0.19	1.00				
14. Father education (ter.)	-0.00	0.03	0.04	0.05	0.04	0.04	-0.01	0.00	-0.03	-0.24	-0.01	0.23	-0.21	1.00			
15. Mother education (sec.)	-0.06	-0.05	0.06	0.11	0.12	0.15	-0.02	-0.08	0.01	-0.27	0.08	0.21	0.39	0.19	1.00		
16. Mother education (ter.)	-0.09	-0.06	-0.01	0.01	-0.01	0.00	-0.04	-0.03	-0.03	-0.17	-0.01	0.14	-0.01	0.35	-0.07	1.00	
17. Ethnicity other (ref. Alb.)	0.07	0.10	-0.02	-0.11	-0.17	-0.06	0.12	0.15	0.02	-0.10	-0.08	0.04	-0.10	0.08	-0.15	-0.01	1.00

Table A3: Determinants of victimisation

VARIABLES	(1) Conflict affected (any)	(2) Conflict affected (any)	(3) Injured or killed (only)	(4) Injured or killed (only)	(5) Displaced (only)	(6) Displaced (only)
Gender	-0.005 (0.024)	-0.005 (0.028)	-0.028 (0.021)	-0.034 (0.028)	-0.001 (0.022)	-0.007 (0.027)
Age	0.002** (0.001)	0.007* (0.004)	0.002*** (0.001)	0.009** (0.004)	0.000 (0.001)	0.005 (0.004)
Age squared		-0.000 (0.000)		-0.000* (0.000)		-0.000 (0.000)
Own Education (Secondary)		-0.047 (0.044)		-0.009 (0.029)		-0.042 (0.047)
Own Education (Tertiary)		-0.043 (0.053)		0.005 (0.045)		-0.033 (0.058)
Father Education (Secondary)	-0.021 (0.036)	-0.025 (0.042)	-0.023 (0.029)	-0.025 (0.033)	-0.030 (0.036)	-0.024 (0.041)
Father Education (Tertiary)	0.019 (0.057)	0.008 (0.069)	0.025 (0.049)	0.027 (0.058)	0.020 (0.055)	0.038 (0.062)
Mother Education (Secondary)	-0.020 (0.040)	-0.017 (0.045)	-0.002 (0.036)	0.001 (0.042)	-0.037 (0.035)	-0.058 (0.039)
Mother Education (Tertiary)	-0.069 (0.068)	-0.041 (0.076)	-0.057 (0.051)	-0.014 (0.067)	-0.094 (0.063)	-0.114 (0.074)
Constant	0.226*** (0.082)	0.149 (0.125)	0.166** (0.074)	0.010 (0.118)	0.215*** (0.078)	0.150 (0.107)
Observations	1,438	1,171	1,438	1,171	1,438	1,171
R-squared	0.101	0.113	0.058	0.067	0.111	0.130
region and ethnicity FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table A4: Voting in Local election – Women only

VARIABLES	(1) Local	(2) Local	(3) Local	(4) Local	(5) Local	(6) Local	(7) Local	(8) Local
Killed or Injured	-0.035 (0.049)	-0.037 (0.049)	-0.005 (0.055)	-0.009 (0.056)	-0.061 (0.068)	-0.065 (0.068)	-0.026 (0.050)	-0.029 (0.050)
Displaced	0.152*** (0.038)	0.147*** (0.039)	0.130** (0.057)	0.125** (0.057)	0.188*** (0.065)	0.189*** (0.064)	0.134*** (0.042)	0.131*** (0.042)
Age	0.008 (0.006)	0.010 (0.006)	0.010 (0.007)	0.012* (0.007)	0.013 (0.008)	0.014* (0.008)	0.007 (0.006)	0.008 (0.006)
Age squared	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)
Own Education (Secondary)		-0.016 (0.032)		0.025 (0.045)		-0.011 (0.052)		-0.021 (0.030)
Own Education (Tertiary)		0.125* (0.069)		0.193** (0.075)		0.147 (0.110)		0.102 (0.066)
Father Education (Secondary)	0.132*** (0.039)	0.118** (0.044)	0.110** (0.046)	0.081 (0.050)	0.096 (0.061)	0.080 (0.064)	0.124*** (0.038)	0.115** (0.042)
Father Education (Tertiary)	0.187** (0.070)	0.150* (0.074)	0.181** (0.083)	0.120 (0.088)	0.193* (0.105)	0.151 (0.108)	0.161** (0.071)	0.128* (0.071)
Mother Education (Secondary)	-0.093 (0.068)	-0.110 (0.074)	-0.116** (0.054)	-0.134** (0.055)	-0.164** (0.072)	-0.180** (0.075)	-0.078 (0.066)	-0.093 (0.072)
Mother Education (Tertiary)	-0.365** (0.149)	-0.394** (0.150)	-0.343** (0.132)	-0.378*** (0.125)	-0.435** (0.176)	-0.460*** (0.173)	-0.366** (0.156)	-0.389** (0.157)
Constant	0.272** (0.104)	0.203 (0.120)	0.195 (0.161)	0.137 (0.163)	0.112 (0.183)	0.083 (0.191)	-0.049 (0.181)	-0.025 (0.186)
Observations	714	714	714	714	533	533	672	672
R-squared	0.160	0.168	0.256	0.268	0.311	0.319	0.182	0.188
municipality and ethnicity FE	Yes	Yes						
location and ethnicity FE							Yes	Yes
psu and ethnicity FE			Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes		

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table A5: Voting in Local election – Men only

VARIABLES	(1) Local	(2) Local	(3) Local	(4) Local	(5) Local	(6) Local	(7) Local	(8) Local
Killed or Injured	0.057 (0.045)	0.057 (0.044)	0.077* (0.041)	0.076* (0.041)	0.056 (0.045)	0.058 (0.044)	0.059 (0.048)	0.060 (0.047)
Displaced	-0.046 (0.045)	-0.045 (0.044)	-0.084* (0.047)	-0.079 (0.048)	-0.075 (0.053)	-0.071 (0.053)	-0.037 (0.040)	-0.035 (0.038)
Age	0.022*** (0.007)	0.021*** (0.006)	0.027*** (0.006)	0.026*** (0.006)	0.023*** (0.007)	0.021*** (0.007)	0.020*** (0.007)	0.018*** (0.006)
Age squared	-0.000** (0.000)	-0.000** (0.000)	-0.000*** (0.000)	-0.000*** (0.000)	-0.000*** (0.000)	-0.000*** (0.000)	-0.000** (0.000)	-0.000** (0.000)
Own Education (Secondary)		0.055 (0.036)		0.076* (0.043)		0.102** (0.044)		0.065 (0.040)
Own Education (Tertiary)		0.108** (0.043)		0.116** (0.050)		0.103** (0.045)		0.120** (0.047)
Father Education (Secondary)	0.021 (0.038)	0.004 (0.039)	0.062 (0.051)	0.045 (0.050)	0.055 (0.051)	0.043 (0.051)	0.035 (0.031)	0.016 (0.033)
Father Education (Tertiary)	0.048 (0.063)	0.026 (0.069)	0.083 (0.066)	0.063 (0.068)	0.108 (0.070)	0.094 (0.071)	0.057 (0.059)	0.033 (0.065)
Mother Education (Secondary)	-0.012 (0.064)	-0.015 (0.065)	0.019 (0.062)	0.019 (0.061)	-0.006 (0.059)	-0.002 (0.058)	-0.008 (0.060)	-0.011 (0.060)
Mother Education (Tertiary)	-0.109 (0.070)	-0.119 (0.071)	-0.057 (0.124)	-0.065 (0.123)	-0.082 (0.120)	-0.079 (0.118)	-0.153* (0.076)	-0.161** (0.073)
Constant	0.330** (0.145)	0.313** (0.150)	0.174 (0.152)	0.153 (0.152)	0.269 (0.165)	0.238 (0.166)	-0.590*** (0.145)	-0.604*** (0.153)
Observations	686	686	686	686	609	609	667	667
R-squared	0.116	0.122	0.271	0.277	0.278	0.286	0.155	0.163
municipality and ethnicity FE	Yes	Yes						
location and ethnicity FE							Yes	Yes
psu and ethnicity FE			Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes		

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table A6: Voting in Parliamentary election – varied samples

VARIABLES	(1) Parliament	(2) Parliament	(3) Parliament	(4) Parliament	(5) Parliament	(6) Parliament	(7) Parliament	(8) Parliament
Panel A - All respondents								
Killed or Injured	0.018 (0.029)	0.017 (0.030)	0.034 (0.034)	0.032 (0.034)	0.020 (0.040)	0.020 (0.040)	0.033 (0.029)	0.032 (0.029)
Displaced	0.074* (0.039)	0.073* (0.039)	0.016 (0.036)	0.017 (0.037)	0.012 (0.036)	0.013 (0.036)	0.066* (0.038)	0.066* (0.038)
Basic controls	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Basic controls + own education		yes		yes		yes		yes
Panel B - Women only								
Killed or Injured	-0.017 (0.059)	-0.017 (0.059)	0.000 (0.052)	-0.004 (0.052)	-0.047 (0.064)	-0.050 (0.064)	0.004 (0.058)	0.003 (0.059)
Displaced	0.147** (0.059)	0.140** (0.058)	0.105* (0.053)	0.102* (0.052)	0.110* (0.063)	0.112* (0.062)	0.123* (0.062)	0.118* (0.060)
Basic controls	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Basic controls + own education		yes		yes		yes		yes
Panel C - Men only								
Killed or Injured	0.033 (0.033)	0.033 (0.033)	0.051 (0.046)	0.051 (0.046)	0.047 (0.050)	0.049 (0.050)	0.039 (0.038)	0.040 (0.038)
Displaced	-0.016 (0.043)	-0.015 (0.042)	-0.059 (0.049)	-0.055 (0.049)	-0.058 (0.050)	-0.054 (0.049)	-0.003 (0.037)	-0.002 (0.036)
Basic controls	Yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Basic controls + own education		yes		yes		yes		yes
municipality and ethnicity FE	Yes	Yes						
location and ethnicity FE							Yes	Yes
psu and ethnicity FE			Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes		

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table A7: Political Party Membership – varied samples

VARIABLES	(1) Party	(2) Party	(3) Party	(4) Party	(5) Party	(6) Party	(7) Party	(8) Party
Panel A - All respondents								
Killed or Injured	0.078*** (0.020)	0.078*** (0.021)	0.051** (0.023)	0.051** (0.023)	0.048* (0.024)	0.047* (0.024)	0.083*** (0.022)	0.083*** (0.022)
Displaced	-0.003 (0.023)	-0.004 (0.022)	0.003 (0.024)	0.003 (0.024)	-0.004 (0.029)	-0.004 (0.028)	-0.006 (0.022)	-0.006 (0.022)
Basic controls	Yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Basic controls + own education		yes		yes		yes		yes
Panel B - Women only								
Killed or Injured	0.000 (0.028)	0.000 (0.028)	-0.015 (0.025)	-0.016 (0.025)	-0.021 (0.023)	-0.021 (0.024)	0.009 (0.029)	0.008 (0.029)
Displaced	0.003 (0.024)	0.001 (0.025)	-0.025 (0.023)	-0.028 (0.024)	-0.050* (0.028)	-0.051* (0.028)	-0.012 (0.020)	-0.014 (0.020)
Basic controls	Yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Basic controls + own education		yes		yes		yes		yes
Panel C - Men only								
Killed or Injured	0.147*** (0.043)	0.147*** (0.043)	0.103** (0.046)	0.103** (0.046)	0.101** (0.048)	0.102** (0.048)	0.152*** (0.047)	0.153*** (0.046)
Displaced	-0.005 (0.043)	-0.005 (0.042)	0.027 (0.049)	0.029 (0.048)	0.024 (0.056)	0.026 (0.056)	0.005 (0.042)	0.006 (0.041)
Basic controls	Yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Basic controls + own education		yes		yes		yes		yes
municipality and ethnicity FE	Yes	Yes						
location and ethnicity FE							Yes	Yes
psu and ethnicity FE			Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes		

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table A8: Participation in Demonstration – varied samples

VARIABLES	(1) Demo	(2) Demo	(3) Demo	(4) Demo	(5) Demo	(6) Demo	(7) Demo	(8) Demo
Panel A - All respondents								
Killed or Injured	0.014 (0.022)	0.012 (0.022)	0.018 (0.023)	0.017 (0.023)	0.012 (0.025)	0.010 (0.026)	0.018 (0.022)	0.017 (0.022)
Displaced	0.065** (0.025)	0.066** (0.025)	0.055** (0.025)	0.055** (0.026)	0.077** (0.033)	0.076** (0.034)	0.072*** (0.024)	0.074*** (0.024)
Basic controls	Yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Basic controls + own education		yes		yes		yes		yes
Panel B - Women only								
Killed or Injured	0.037 (0.036)	0.034 (0.035)	0.016 (0.033)	0.013 (0.032)	0.028 (0.035)	0.025 (0.035)	0.042 (0.035)	0.038 (0.035)
Displaced	0.013 (0.024)	0.014 (0.022)	0.026 (0.039)	0.023 (0.039)	0.007 (0.050)	0.005 (0.052)	-0.002 (0.023)	0.001 (0.021)
Basic controls	Yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Basic controls + own education		yes		yes		yes		yes
Panel C - Men only								
Killed or Injured	-0.024 (0.046)	-0.024 (0.045)	0.025 (0.041)	0.025 (0.041)	-0.006 (0.043)	-0.005 (0.044)	-0.010 (0.048)	-0.009 (0.046)
Displaced	0.114** (0.048)	0.115** (0.047)	0.089** (0.044)	0.093** (0.043)	0.125** (0.053)	0.129** (0.052)	0.136*** (0.044)	0.137*** (0.043)
Basic controls	Yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Basic controls + own education		yes		yes		yes		yes
municipality and ethnicity FE	Yes	Yes						
location and ethnicity FE							Yes	Yes
psu and ethnicity FE			Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes		

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table A9: Participation in Strike – varied samples

VARIABLES	(1) Strike	(2) Strike	(3) Strike	(4) Strike	(5) Strike	(6) Strike	(7) Strike	(8) Strike
Panel A - All respondents								
Killed or Injured	-0.002 (0.026)	-0.004 (0.024)	0.012 (0.021)	0.011 (0.021)	0.002 (0.025)	0.001 (0.025)	-0.006 (0.026)	-0.007 (0.025)
Displaced	0.003 (0.022)	0.004 (0.022)	-0.004 (0.025)	-0.004 (0.025)	0.015 (0.030)	0.015 (0.030)	0.007 (0.023)	0.008 (0.023)
Basic controls	Yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Basic controls + own education		yes		yes		yes		yes
Panel B - Women only								
Killed or Injured	0.019 (0.035)	0.017 (0.034)	0.001 (0.026)	-0.001 (0.025)	-0.008 (0.034)	-0.009 (0.033)	0.015 (0.034)	0.013 (0.033)
Displaced	-0.008 (0.022)	-0.008 (0.023)	0.003 (0.031)	0.000 (0.031)	0.012 (0.040)	0.011 (0.041)	-0.012 (0.023)	-0.011 (0.024)
Basic controls	Yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Basic controls + own education		yes		yes		yes		yes
Panel C - Men only								
Killed or Injured	-0.032 (0.033)	-0.031 (0.032)	0.020 (0.037)	0.019 (0.037)	-0.004 (0.037)	-0.002 (0.037)	-0.028 (0.034)	-0.026 (0.033)
Displaced	0.006 (0.036)	0.007 (0.035)	-0.010 (0.036)	-0.003 (0.035)	0.014 (0.040)	0.019 (0.039)	0.019 (0.035)	0.021 (0.035)
Basic controls	Yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Basic controls + own education		yes		yes		yes		yes
municipality and ethnicity FE	Yes	Yes						
location and ethnicity FE							Yes	Yes
psu and ethnicity FE			Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes		

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table A10: Signing a Petition – varied samples

VARIABLES	(1) Petition	(2) Petition	(3) Petition	(4) Petition	(5) Petition	(6) Petition	(7) Petition	(8) Petition
Panel A - All respondents								
Killed or Injured	0.010 (0.028)	0.010 (0.029)	0.021 (0.029)	0.021 (0.029)	0.005 (0.030)	0.005 (0.030)	0.013 (0.028)	0.012 (0.028)
Displaced	0.032 (0.032)	0.032 (0.032)	0.051* (0.027)	0.051* (0.027)	0.044 (0.034)	0.044 (0.034)	0.035 (0.031)	0.035 (0.031)
Basic controls	Yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Basic controls + own education		yes		yes		yes		yes
Panel B - Women only								
Killed or Injured	-0.001 (0.032)	-0.001 (0.033)	0.007 (0.033)	0.007 (0.032)	0.004 (0.038)	0.004 (0.037)	-0.001 (0.034)	-0.002 (0.035)
Displaced	0.029 (0.039)	0.025 (0.040)	0.086 (0.052)	0.082 (0.051)	0.041 (0.065)	0.041 (0.064)	0.012 (0.042)	0.009 (0.044)
Basic controls	Yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Basic controls + own education		yes		yes		yes		yes
Panel C - Men only								
Killed or Injured	0.005 (0.050)	0.005 (0.049)	0.033 (0.049)	0.032 (0.049)	0.018 (0.054)	0.020 (0.054)	0.022 (0.051)	0.023 (0.050)
Displaced	0.029 (0.047)	0.030 (0.046)	0.036 (0.041)	0.040 (0.041)	0.053 (0.048)	0.056 (0.048)	0.048 (0.041)	0.049 (0.040)
Basic controls	Yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Basic controls + own education		yes		yes		yes		yes
municipality and ethnicity FE	Yes	Yes						
location and ethnicity FE							Yes	Yes
psu and ethnicity FE			Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes		

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

